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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
UK TliJ: STATK i)K UTAH 
* k ft * > '. * K * » /< » 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSON, JR., 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSON, 
Plaintitts/AppeLldiiLs, 
v. 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS, 
GEORGE BRUCE BREINHOLT and 
WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE NO. 14006 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
DAB ASSOCIATES, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS, 
GEORGE BRUCE BREINHOLT AND WELDON L. DAINES 
x x 7v 7v * * * * i j'c ' k * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thi& i* ; mlawful detainer action brought by Appellants 
for allege* ' . t -\ • r U M I .iqreenieni "\ I L 
Respondents counterclaimed for breach oi the covenant oJ 
qi i:i e t :ii: I peaceful possession, malicious prosecution, 
attorney "' s fees and puniti ve damages. Respondents P iM 
Associates, Anagnostakis (herein referred to as "Aggie") 
"
,l
* ' "' ill, iinl Ih'iivi^ fj (..ill hereinafter collectively referred 
•-.•
 ifDAB") also counterclaimed . ; y 
Appellants• 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial was held before the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
District Judge of the Third Judicial District, sitting 
without a jury. Following conclusion of the trial, the 
court entered a decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment awarding attorney's fees to all Respon-
dents, awarding Respondent DAB $613.01 for debts owed to 
them by the Appellants, and dismissing all other claims of 
Appellants and Respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent DAB prays that the Judgment be reversed as 
follows: (1) as to the Trial Court's denial of Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss based upon waiver, collateral estoppel and 
res judicata; (2) as to the Trial Court's denial of Respon-
dent's Motion to Dismiss for defective notice; (3) as to the 
Trial Court's dismissal of Respondent's counterclaim against 
Appellants for violation of the covenant of quiet and peaceful 
possession. In all other respects, Respondent DAB prays 
that the Judgment be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the outset, it should be noted that the Appellants, 
in their statement of facts, have relied largely on those 
aspects of the record which are most favorable to themselves, 
-2-
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to the exclusion of other facts which are far more supportive 
of the District Court's decision. Under familiar rules of 
appeal, this Court must do just the opposite, i.e. it must 
view the evidence most favorably to the Trial Court's Judgment. 
Hoggin & Hall & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 
P.2d 89 (1966). Therefore, in order that this court be 
fully cognizant of the evidence which prompted and supports 
the Trial Court's decision, the Respondents believe that a 
restatement of the facts contained in the record is essential 
and necessary to this review. 
In order to avoid duplication, Respondent DAB incorpor-
ates by reference the Statement of Facts contained in Respondent 
Nikol's Brief. However, the following facts, relevant only 
to those issues peculiar to this Brief, must be provided to 
supplement the statement of facts offered by Respondent 
Nikols: j 
Appellants are lessees of certain real property on 
which they operate the Salt Lake Athletic Club (formerly the 
Towne House Athletic Club) (R.83). For ten years prior to 
December 1, 1971, Appellants operated a dining room for the 
benefit of club members (R.92) and the Appellants leased 
the dining room facilities to Respondent Nikols on or about 
December 1, 1971 (R.242). The portions of the lease to 
Nikols which are relevant to this Brief are as follows: 
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16. * * * 
Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if either 
defaults in any of the conditions and terms of this 
lease, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including attorney fees, which may arise or 
accrue from enforcing this lease or in obtaining 
possession of the premises or in pursuing any remedy 
provided by the laws of the State of Utah whether by 
filing suit or otherwise. (emphasis added) 
(Exhibit 13-P; R.251) 
* * * 
19. Heirs and Assigns. This Sublease shall inure to 
the benefit of and be binding upon the heirs, successor 
and assigns of the parties hereto. (emphasis added) 
(Exhibit 13-P; R.252) 
On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols transferred the 
restaurant to Respondent DAB (R.254). Appellants consented 
to this action, by signing a document entitled "Consent to 
Sublease", the relevant portion of which is as follows: 
The undersigned, OLAF T. STEVENSEN and 
BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, the Lessor in that certain 
lease, for the premises designated 158 South 3rd 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereby consents 
pursuant to Paragraph 18 thereof to the assignment 
of NICK N. NIKOLS, of said lease to WELDEN L. 
DAINES, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS, & G. B. BREINHOLT. 
(emphasis added) (Exhibit 9-P) 
At the time that DAB accepted the assignment, members 
of the Towne House Athletic Club (now the Salt Lake Athletic 
Club) were allowed to charge their meals (R.198-199). Mr. 
Nikols testified that this credit was extended "only as a 
courtesy to Mr. Stevensen" and at Stevenson's specific 
request and insistence (R.182). When some of the members of 
the Towne House Athletic Club failed to pay their bills, 
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Aggie approached Stevensen's secretary, who informed him 
that the charges were "trade-outs" which Mr. Stevensen had 
allowed specific members to sign and Aggie so understood 
them to be (R.199). The person responsible for a large 
share of the charges, Mr. Reed Watkins (a lawyer in the firm 
representing Appellant) stated to Aggie that he continued 
charging only because Stevensen owed him money (R.199). 
Stevensen has acknowledged his indebtedness to Aggie for the 
stated amount and has promised to work something out on the 
rent (R.199-200). 
On or about July 15f 1974, Stevensen advised Aggie that 
thereafter he would not back any charges made by members of 
his club and upon being so advised Aggie thereafter refused 
to extend any further credit to Towne House Club members 
(R.211). The sum of $613.01 awarded by the Trial Court to 
the Respondent included only those charges made prior to 
July 15, 1974, the date of Stevensen's refusal to back up 
charges made by members of his club (Exhibit 22-D). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF 
APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED, AND THE APPEAL 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The arguments of this point respecting Points I and II 
of plaintiff's appeal are identical to those presented in 
Point I of the Reply Brief of Respondent Nick N. Nikols. The 
points raised therein by Respondent Nikols apply equally to 
5-
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these Respondents and, Respondent Nikols having accurately 
stated the law with respect thereto, these Respondents adopt 
Point I of Respondent Nikols brief herein to the same full 
extent and effect as if reiterated in full herein. In 
addition to the discussion by Respondent Nikols, Respondent 
DAB offers the following with respect to Point III of 
Plaintiff's appeal: 
It is clear from the authorities cited and arguments 
presented in Point I of the Reply Brief of Respondent 
Nick N. Nikols, that the shorter periods for filing a notice 
of appeal should apply to Point III, as well as Points I and 
II, of plaintiff's appeal. It is obvious that only one appeal 
time should be applicable to a single appeal, although it 
involves severable and distinct claims. Thus, the question 
which presents itself to this court, is which of the two 
periods for filing a notice of appeal should be applicable 
to this action. 
In 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 431 at page 82, 
the following rule is stated: 
As between two such special periods, either of which, 
if it stood alone, would be capable of applying to 
a particular situation, that which points the more 
directly and specifically to the case at hand is the 
one with which the party appealing must conform; 
. . . (citing cases.) 
i 
Thus, where the action was brought and can best be defined as | 
one in unlawful detainer, the specific appeal time provided 
in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-36-11 (1953) must be applied. ' 
-6-
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A similar, but even more compelling, reason for applying 
the shorter time for filing a notice of appeal, is provided 
by the fact that this Court must defer to the legislative 
intent expressed in the unlawful detainer statute. See Stanton 
v, Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974). It is 
clear from the various provisions of the statute, including 
the shortened time for appearance provided in Section 78-36-8 
and the shortened time for filing a notice of appeal provided 
in Section 78-36-11, that the legislature intended to provide 
in the unlawful detainer statute a summary method for resolving 
conflicts arising thereunder. It is equally clear that the 
application of the longer appeal period to this case would 
do violence to that expressed legislative intent. Thus, if 
this Court determines that only one appeal time should apply 
to this appeal, the shorter period should apply and the 
appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Even if we 
assume arguendo that two distinct periods for filing a 
notice of appeal should apply, it is clear that the issues 
raised in Points I and II of the Appellant's brief should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and this court's review 
be restricted to the issues presented in Point III. Any 
other conclusion would violate the legislature's clearly 
expressed intent. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE DOCTRINES OF 
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICE TO CURE DEFAULT OR QUIT AND 
NOTICE TO QUIT ARE DEFECTIVE AND INADEQUATE TO 
SUPPORT AN ACTION IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
Points II and III are identical to Points II and III of 
the Reply Brief of Respondent Nick N. Nikols. The points 
raised therein by Respondent Nikols apply equally to these 
Respondents and, Respondent Nikols having accurately stated 
the law with respect thereto, these Respondents adopt 
Points II and III of Respondent Nikols1 brief herein to the 
same full extent and effect as if reiterated in full herein, 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
DEFENDANT DAB WAS PROPER 
A. The Lease Agreement Provides for Award of 
Attorney's Fees. 
B. When the Trial Court Specifically Dismissed 
Plaintiffs' Complaint Against Defendants, No Cause of 
Action, the Court Should Have Found as a Matter of Law 
that the Plaintiffs Had Breached the Covenant of Quiet 
and Peaceful Possession. 
Subparagraphs A and B of this point are identical to 
Subparagraphs A and B of Point IV of the Reply Brief of 
Respondent Nick N. Nikols, The points raised therein by 
Respondent Nikols apply equally to these Respondents and, 
Respondent Nikols having accurately stated the law with 
respect thereto, these Respondents adopt Subparagraphs A and 
B of Point IV of Respondent Nikols' brief herein to the same 
full extent and effect as if reiterated in full herein. In 
-8-
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addition to the discussion by Respondent Nikols, Respondent 
DAB offers the following with respect to Subparagraph B 
hereof: 
The Respondents, by raising a counterclaim against the 
Appellants for a breach of covenant of quiet and peaceful 
possession, were enforcing the lease and pursuing a remedy 
provided by the laws of the State of Utah. Thus the court's 
award of attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of 
Paragraph 16 of the lease was proper and appropriate. The 
Appellants have attempted to undermine this conclusion by 
suggesting that Paragraph 16 of the lease provides that in 
the event of default only the defaulting party would pay 
attorney's fees, and arguing that since the Trial Court 
determined that the Respondents in their counterclaim, had 
failed to prove their cause of action, it affirmatively 
established that the Appellants were not in default. Such a 
conclusion is wholly unmerited for the reasons hereinafter 
discussed. 
At the outset, it should be noted that under standard 
and familiar rules of appeal, the findings and conclusions 
of the Trial Court are presumed to be valid and the burden 
is on the Appellant to establish otherwise. Latimer v. Katz, 
29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973); Hardy v. Hendrickson, 
27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972); Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973). The Supreme Court must not 
disturb the ruling on appeal unless it " . . . manifestly 
-9-
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appears that the court misapplied the law to the established 
facts." Hardy v. Hendriclcson, supra, at 29. The following 
review of the law and facts manifestly shows that the Trial 
Court accurately applied the applicable law.
 fi o 
In view of the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the ; 
lease, the court's award of attorney's fees constitutes a 
tacit acknowledgement that the Plaintiff/Appellant was in 
default of the lease. The Appellant argues, howeverf that 
such a conclusion is unwarranted because of the court's 
determination that the Respondents failed to establish a 
cause of action under their counterclaim. Such an argument 
erroneously assumes that a court's ruling of "no cause of 
action" in a contract action necessarily establishes that 
the Defendant (Plaintiff here) did not breach the provisions 
of the lease or contract. 
In fact, under general principles of contract law, such 
a ruling could be based on several alternative grounds. For 
example, as provided in 17A C.J.S. Contracts §§ 533, 566, it 
is necessary in order to state a cause of action ex contractu 
that the Plaintiff allege and prove (1) the existence of a 
valid contract, (2) the obligation of the Defendant thereunder, 
(3) the violation of the contract's provisions by the Defendant, 
and (4) damages resulting therefrom. Thus, in the absence 
of allegations and proof of damage, a breach of contract 
action is not sufficient to support a judgment. This position 
-10-
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has been sustained in several cases, including M. G. Chamberlain 
& Co. v. Simpson, 173 C.A.2d 263, 343 P.2d 438 (1959) and 
Hodges v. Gronvold, 54 Wash. 2d 478, 341 P.2d 857 (1959). 
In Hodges, the Supreme Court of Washington held that regardless 
of whether a breach of the contractual provisions was 
proven, a failure to prove and establish damages resulting 
therefrom is a sufficient basis for the Trial Court's dismissal 
of the action by a judgment of nonsuit. As the Court 
stated at 341 P.2d 858: 
Since a showing of damages was necessary to 
sustain appellants' cause of action, the trial court, 
having concluded that no proof of damages had been made 
by appellants, did not pass upon the question of 
whether or not respondents had breached the contract. 
It is therefore clear that a judgment of "no cause of action" 
may well be based solely on a finding that the Plaintiffs 
(Defendants here) failed to establish the requisite element 
of damages resulting from the breach. Similarly, the California 
District Court of Appeals in Chamberlain stated: 
. . ... The elements of a cause of action for 
breach of contract are the making of the contract and 
its terms, plaintiff's performance, defendants' breach, 
and damage to plaintiff therefrom. (emphasis added) 
(343 P.2d 445) 
The Supreme Court of Utah also held that proof of damages is 
an essential element of a cause of action ex contractu in 
State Automobile & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 27 Utah 
2d 229, 494 P.2d 529 (1972), when it stated: "[IJJ[ failure 
to so perform those duties results in damage to the other 
-11-
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party he is entitled to recover for breach of contractual 
duties." (emphasis added) (494 P.2d 531, 532) : t 
Thus the court's determination that the Respondents 
failed to prove their cause of action for breach of the 
covenant of quiet and peaceful possession on their counterclaim 
did not establish that the Appellants were not in default 
under the lease as Appellants claim. The court's determina-
tion must have been based on its finding that the Respondent 
failed to establish the existence of damages and thus failed 
to prove the cause of action. Such a conclusion not only 
supports the presumption of validity of the Court's findings 
r 
and conclusions but also shows a proper application of the 
law to the facts. 
The concept is bolstered by the fact that the terms of 
the lease do not grant attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party, but rather, provide that, in the event of default, 
the defaulting party should pay attorney's fees. Thus, the 
Court must have concluded that the Appellants were in default 
and were therefore liable for attorney's fees, but denied 
the Respondent's claims on an alternative basis, such as a 
failure to establish the existence of damages resulting from 
the Appellant's default. 
C. Respondent DAB is Entitled to an Award of 
Attorney Fees by Virtue of the Lease Agreement. 
The facts of this case and the applicable law show that 
the agreement between Respondent Nikols and Respondent DAB 
-12-
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constituted an assignment of all of the terms and conditions 
of the principal lease and, therefore, the provision of said 
lease providing for the payment of attorney's fees by a 
defaulting party inures to the benefit of Respondent DAB as 
an assignee of the principal lease. Appellants argue that 
an attorney's fee provision of the lease between the Appellants 
and Respondent Nikols does not inure to the benefit of 
Respondent DAB. Such an argument lacks merit for although 
the subsequent lease between Respondents DAB and Nikols 
purports to be a sublease between said parties, it in fact 
constitutes an assignment of the principle lease between the 
Appellants and Respondent Nikols. As such it is clear that 
Respondent DAB thereby became a beneficiary of the provisions 
of the principle lease, both under a plain interpretation of 
the lease and under the general principles of the case law. 
In comparing the two leases involved (i.e. both the 
principle lease between Stevensen and Nikols, and the subsequent 
lease between Nikols and DAB), it is clear that Nikols 
conveyed his entire estate, retaining no reversionary interest 
in the lease. The leases terminate on the same day, the 
30th day of November, 1976, and provide for precisely the 
same options to renew. Further evaluation of the two leases 
shows that Nikols conveyed to DAB all of the rights and 
responsibilities which he received and undertook pursuant to 
his lease with Stevensen - the terms of the two leases are 
identical and any variations are entirely superficial. 
-13-
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It is clearly established in the case law that the 
conveyance of an entire estate is ,an assignment of the 
principle lease and not the creation of a sublease. This 
principle holds true regardless of provisions within the 
lease which would suggest otherwise. In Jensen v. O.K. 
Investment Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 231, 235-6, 507 P.2d 713, 
716 (1973), this Court, citing 3A Thompson on Real Property 
(1954 Replacement), Sec. 1210, pp. 53-55, stated that: 
. . . Technical terms or special words are not 
necessary to an assignment. Any language which shows 
the intention of the parties to transfer the property 
from one to the other is sufficient, the form of the 
instrument being immaterial. If it has the legal 
effect to pass to another the lessee's interest in the 
whole or in any part of the demised premises for his 
entire term, or the remainder of his term, it is an 
assignment . . . 
The formal character of the paper or the desig-
nation given the transaction in the contract is not 
o important in determining whether an instrument is a 
sublease or an assignment. When the lessee's entire 
estate passes the instrument is an assignment, though 
words of demise are used, and rent and a right of 
reentry for nonpayment are reserved, or even though 
it is called a sublease . . . . The test is whether 
the grant leaves a reversionary interest in the 
original lessee or operates to transfer his entire 
term . . . . 
A sublease for the whole term is in law an assign-
ment as between the original lessor and the sublessee, 
Where the instrument creates an assignment and not 
a sublease the relationship of landlord and tenant 
exists between the lessor and the assignee and 
their rights inter se are determined accordingly, 
(emphasis added)
 t 
Accord; 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 392,51C 
C.J\S. Landlord and Tenant § 37(1), May v. Walters, 67 N.M. 297, 
354 P.2d 1114 (1960), Gordon Inv. Co. v. Jones 123 Colo 253, 
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.n 
227 P.2d 336 (1951), Groth v. Continental Oil Co, 84 Ida. 
409, 373 P.2d 548 (1962), Bedgisoff v. Morgan, 23 Wash. 2d 737, 
162 P.2d 238 (1945). By this statement of the law it is 
manifestly clear that the conveyance of his entire term by 
Respondent Nikols constituted an assignment of the principle 
lease. Further and conclusive support for this position is 
derived from the instrument whereby the Appellant agreed to 
the transfer. In the Consent to Sublease (Exhibit 9-P), 
the Appellant agreed "to the assignment of Nick N. Nikols, 
of said lease to Weldon L. Daines, George Anagnostakis, and 
G. B. Breinhardt." (emphasis added) It is, therefore, 
conclusively established that the instrument reflecting the 
agreement between Respondent Nikols and Respondent DAB 
constituted an assignment of the principle lease. 
Since the agreement between Respondents Nikols and DAB 
constitutes an assignment of the Stevensen-Nikols lease, it 
is clear that the attorney's fees provision inures to the 
benefit of Respondent DAB, as the assignee of said lease. 
The principle lease clearly establishes that it was the 
intention of both Appellant Stevensen and Respondent Nikols 
that all of the lease provisions should both burden and 
benefit all assignees of the lease. Paragraph 19 of the 
principle lease resolutely provides that "this sublease 
shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the heirs, 
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto." (Exhibit 13-P, 
R.252). Thus, by specific agreement between Appellant 
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Stevensen and Respondent Nikols, the provisions of the 
principle lease were intended to inure to the benefit of all 
assignees of the lessee. The intent of the parties at the 
time they entered into the principle lease must prevail. The 
parties having agreed that their successors and assigns 
would hold and be subject to all of the benefits of the 
lease, it must be held that DAB, an assignee, is entitled to 
the benefits of the attorney's fee provisions of the lease. 
Assuming arguendo that the provisions of Paragraph 19 
are not explicit and conclusive it is nevertheless clear, 
under general principles of property law, that the attorney's 
fees provision of the principle lease inures to the benefit 
of Respondent DAB as an assignee of said lease. The traditional 
view is well-stated in 1 American Law of Property § 3.61 
(1952), at 311: 
"The lessee's assignee acquires the estate of the 
lessee and comes into privity of estate with the 
lessor by force of the assignment, without entry. He 
therefore has the benefit and burden of all covenants 
running with the land so long as he holds the estate. 
Accord 2 Powell, Real Property 1(246(1), (2) (1974). 
And as stated in 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 397: 
"According to the prevailing view, a lessee, during 
his occupancy of the demised premises, holds both by 
privity of estate and of contract. When he assigns his 
lease, he divests himself of the privity of estate, 
although not of the privity of contract. By such assign-
ment a privity of estate is at once created between the 
assignee and the original lessor . . . " (citing 
cases) 
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It is further stated at 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant 
S 449, that: 
"The assignee of a leasehold estate succeeds to all 
the interest of the lessee and to the benefit of all 
the covenants and agreements of the lessor which are 
next to and run with the estate. As a general rule, 
covenants by the lessor in a lease relating to the 
thing demised run with the land so that an action at 
law can be maintained in the name of the assignee, even 
though the covenant does not in certain instances, have 
reference to something to be done upon the land itself." 
(Citing cases) 
Thus, the agreement between Respondent Nikols and 
Respondent DAB being an assignment of the principle lease, 
the provision within the principle lease granting a right to 
recover attorney fees and expenses incurred in curing any 
default under the principle lease inures to the benefit of 
Respondent DAB. Although the attorney's fee provision does 
not refer specifically to the premises itself, the rule is 
equally applicable. As stated by the Oregon Supreme Court 
in Hudspeth v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., 247 Ore. 372, 430 
P.2d 353, 356 (1967): 
"There is nothing in the nature of things which re-
quires the conclusion that the benefit of a covenant is 
not capable of running with the land unless the perfor-
mance of the promise will constitute an advantage of a 
physical sense to the promises in leases have been held 
to run to successors of the lessor in cases where the 
promise was not related to the physical use of the 
land." 
It is further stated in 2 Powell, Real Property, 1(246 (2) 
(1974), that: 
"In general, modern cases seek to determine whether the 
covenant was intended by the original parties to be 
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performed only by the covenantor personally, or to 
inure only to the benefit of the covenantee personally, 
or, as is usually the case, was intended by them to 
regulate the relations of the persons who from time to 
time might be lessor and lessee of the affected premises. 
Except when the covenant is found to have the atypical 
personal character, both burden and benefit run to the 
successors of the original lessor and lessee." 
(emphasis added) 
It is self-evident that a lease provision which grants 
attorney's fees expended in curing a default under the lease 
is not personal to the principle parties, but rather regulates 
the relations of whoever occupies the position of lessor and 
lessee of the premises, since the only person having any 
interest in curing the default is the person standing in the 
position of a lessee or lessor; the original covenantors 
having lost both the ability and interest to cure such a 
default by their assignment of the lease. Thus, it is clear 
that the attorney's fees provision in the principle lease 
runs with the land and therefore inures to the benefit of 
Respondent DAB. 
In 1940, this court held, in a case factually distinctive 
from the instant case, that a lease provision which provided 
that either party would pay cost and attorney's fees incurred 
by the other in enforcing the covenants of the lease did not 
run with the land and was a personal covenant between the 
parties to the contract. In Latses vs. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 
Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940), it was held that, since the 
Appellant was an assignee of the lessor and did not expressly 
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agree to abide by all the terms of the lease, such a provision 
within the lease could not be held valid as against such 
Appellant/Assignee. The case is distinguishable from the 
instant case. The Appellant in Latses was the assignee of 
the lessor whereas here DAB is the assignee of the lessee. 
And the Latses Court laid heavy emphasis on the fact that 
the assignee did not expressly agree to abide by all the 
terms of the lease whereas here the assignee (DAB) expressly 
bound itself to all the terms and obligations of the lease 
(Exhibit 6-P, R.260). While there may be reasons for not 
enforcing a provision within the principle lease against an 
assignee which did not expressly agree to the provision, the 
same policies do not apply where it is the assignee who is 
attempting to enforce the provisions of a lease and where the 
assignee has expressly agreed to abide by all of the lease 
provisions. 
It should also be noted that the Court's decision in 
Latses conflicts with the modern trend of authorities as 
summarized by Powell on Real Property, supra, and with the 
general weight of authority handed down in recent decisions 
by the courts of the surrounding states. For example: The 
Supreme Court of Oregon in Jack Mathis General Contractors, 
Inc. v. Murphy, 472 P.2d 820 (1970), held that a promise in 
a lease to pay an attorney's fee was a covenant that ran 
with the reversion (i.e. the land) and was enforceable 
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against the lessor by an assignee. And the California District 
Court of Appeal, in Rosenkranz v. Pellin, 99 C.A. 2d 650, 222 
P.2d 249, 251 (1950) also held that: 
"A lessee is under a duty to his lessor to perform the 
covenants of the lease. An assignee who assumes the 
lease binds himself to perform these covenants. . . . 
[The assignee] was bound to respondent by the covenants 
of the lease by which the lessee agreed to pay the 
lessor a reasonable attorney's fee in the event an 
action was filed to compel the performance of the terms 
and conditions of the lease or to terminate it." 
In view of the fact that the position taken by the Utah 
Supreme Court is not directly applicable to the case involved 
here, and the additional fact that such a position has not 
been adopted by other states, the Court's holding in Latses 
is not binding on nor dispositive of this case. 
POINT V 
ANY CHANGE IN THE OPERATION OF THE LEASED 
PREMISES WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE LEASE 
POINT VI 
THE ALLEGED BREACHES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO RESULT IN A FORFEITURE OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' LEASE AGREEMENT 
Points V and VI are identical to Points V and VI of the 
Reply Brief of Respondent Nick N. Nikols. The points raised 
therein by Respondent Nikols apply equally to these Respondents 
and, Respondent Nikols having accurately stated the law with 
respect thereto, these Respondents adopt Points V and VI of 
Respondent Nikols brief herein to the same full extent and 
effect as if reiterated in full herein. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED $613.01 TO RESPONDENT 
DAB FOR DEBTS OWED TO THEM BY THE APPELLANTS. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the Trial Court1s 
failure to establish a legal basis for its award of $613.01 
to Respondent DAB, if in fact it did not, is not a basis for 
reversing its decision. This Court has repeatedly held that 
even where the Trial Court based its decision on an un-
substantiated point of law, the decision will not be reversed 
if there existed a legitimate and solid basis for the ruling, 
e.g. Foss Lewis & Sons v. General Ins. Co. of America, 30 
Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (1973), Green Ditch Water Co. v. 
Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964). Reason 
dictates that the same general rule applies where the Trial 
Court fails to state the legal basis for its decision. 
Thus, if the Trial Court's decision and analysis of the 
evidence can be sustained under any legal theory, it may not 
be overturned. 
A review of the trial transcript clearly reveals that 
there is a substantial basis for the court's determination 
that Appellant Stevensen is indebted to Respondent DAB in 
the sum of $613.01. The testimony of Respondent Nikols and 
Respondent Aggie is uncontroverted. And that testimony 
establishes the basis upon which the Court made its deter-
mination. Nikols testified that the practice of allowing 
members of the Town House Athletic Club to charge their 
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meals began during his tenure as operator of the restaurant 
and was undertaken at the specific request and insistence of 
Stevensen (R. 182). Upon assuming the lease from Nikols, 
Respondent Aggie continued the practice (R.198-199). When 
the charges remained unpaid, Aggie approached Stevensen's 
secretary about the matter and was informed that the charges 
were "trade-outs" which Mr. Stevensen had undertaken with 
members of his club (R. 199). In reliance on this representation, 
Aggie continued the practice (R. 199, 201). Aggie's belief 
in Stevensen's obligation for the charges was bolstered when 
he was informed by Mr. Reed Watkins, Stevensen1s lawyer and 
the person responsible for a large share of the charges, 
that he, Watkins, continued to charge at the restaurant only 
because Stevensen owed him money (R. 199). Finally, in a 
conversation with Aggie, Stevensen acknowledged his indebt-
edness to Aggie and promised to work something out on the 
rent (R. 200). 
This uncontroverted evidence is clearly sufficient to 
establish that Stevensen is liable to Aggie for the $613.01, 
both as a result of the agreement which Stevensen had 
reached with the members of his club to whom he owed money, 
and as a result of an actual or implied contract between 
Aggie and Stevensen. The testimony is further bolstered by 
an analysis of the charge slips and billing sheet entered 
into evidence as Exhibit 22-D. Those documents reveal that 
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the lion's share of the charges are made by either Stevensen, 
(Stevensew'; v Com*- <;s .-iud^d fror :;ucn :v^dence 
that the charges made at Aggiefs restaurant were part of a 
scheme whereby Stevensen was paying bis :^.*-. • : members 
and encouraging such members to use * is clul -* adjacent 
Appellants can not argue that the evidence is disputed. 
Stevensen did not refute the testimony of "• « Respondent , 
and/ where a party possesses • -. - •• . oaj<. ma1 .t< 
not produce evidence, with respect thereto, it :i s presumed 
that tt le evi dence wou ] d be adv< T N O fn hi r- r I ai in , Blackburn 
v. Colvin, 191 Kan, 239, 380 P. 2d 4 1/ (I'ibll; Budget Plan 
Haner, 12 I< la 56
 f 436 P. 2d 111 ( 1 968). 
^ateci by I :! le Siipi: eme Coi :i :i : I: :) I: I J I .ah ^.raerican 
Scale Mfg. Co, v, Zee, 120 Utah 402r 40 7, 23^ r . 2d 363 
(1951): 
Where the testimony of a witness is uncontra-
dicted and not inherently improbable, and there are 
no circumstances tending to raise a doubt of its truth, 
the facts so proven should be taken as conclusively 
established and verdict directed or decision entered 
accordingly. (citing National Bank of Commerce in 
N.Y. v, Bottolfson, 55 S.D. ] 96r 225 N W. 385, 386, 
69 A.L.R. 892 (1929)) 
• The evidence of the debt being uncontroverted, not 
inheres ; •- improbable, and there being no c:i rcumstances 
raisinc; .,; ibt as to its trutl i, the debt has been conclusive 
established ;:•.-. ;;;<J judgment must be sustained. 
23-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore, Respondents1 testimony concerning the 
representations made by Stevensen himself and by his secretary 
clearly establishes Appellant's obligation since his repre-
sentations are admissions against interest. This court 
recognized the fundamental principle when it stated in 
Petersen v. Anderson, 115 Utah 548, 549, 206 P.2d 714, 715-
(1949) : "It needs no citation of authorities that an admission 
against interest is competent evidence as to the facts 
contained therein." Appellant's own admissions, as testified 
to by Respondents, are sufficient basis for an award of 
judgment in favor of Respondent DAB; the admission by his 
secretary merely makes the conclusion more inescapable. As 
stated in 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 600, 
. . . [T]he admissions of a party made directly by 
him, or through his agent duly authorized to speak 
for him, or by a privy, relative to the subject 
matter of a suit, are admissible in evidence against 
such party where they are inconsistent with the 
claim he asserts in the action, whether he is the 
plaintiff or the defendant, and whether or not he 
is available as a witness. (emphasis added; citing 
cases) 
Despite Appellant's arguments to the contrary, Stevensen's 
secretary was his agent, and therefore had the authority to 
speak for and on behalf of Stevensen. As stated in 3 C.J.S. 
Agency §§ 16, 548, whether an individual is an agent or a 
servant depends on the facts peculiar to the case, and 
whether the act in controversy is within the scope of his 
employment is a question for the trier of fact. The Trial 
Court found on uncontroverted evidence that Stevensen's 
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secretary was his agent and that Aggie justifiably relied 
"in lpoi 1 her ai ltl 1 or i t } tc: acki iow] edge t h e :i n d e b t e d n e s s of h e r 
principal. 
Even i f we assume arguendo that tne e^? ier^e it 
dispute,- i s the Trial. Court '"unr-t-inn * , ^ -t^ L ; 
of the evidence, observe the demeanor :>f Lh * witjessep. and 
make ised ixpoa * • < j 
credibility t . • v.tnesses and the saif .-ciene\ ,»i 
evidenc- Th<j o -^  t evaluated the witnesses 3nd the i c 
. > 'ven.qpn was .. ^a"LC« 10 
:u Respondent i he amount jt t i3 TJ ** above-statei 
evidf J. ' , , . 
Court, sitting a, ti u r o. L x---> muv exercise it prerogative 
> believe ot disbelieve whom i* chooses 11 . Radium 
King Mines
 y - L ^ , * State by 
and Through Road Commission v. White, L 14 i . , i 449 
P. 2d (19 69); Holland > . n x w; i^ uuan zu 4z<s, I P 2d 
.!"«" jil 4 4'* (1964) Ii I the instant case i t chose to 
believe Aggie and was therefore constrained to find til lat 
! II o v e i i s c ' i i i'!/.ii!"« 1 j i i M i ' f o i I h e n i ' u t i q o s i r u i J c b y I IM> niiinl! i •. ni" 
liis club at his request and insistence. 
It should be noted I i i conclusion that a reversal } uuo 
" . 3om i: t: s decision would resit 11 i n -.i wimlld 1 J t'o. r.e 
Appellant. The evidence shows that Respondent DAB!s willingness 
to allow the members of tli<j Appellant1,1. lull I IIMM]'1 «it 
• 2 5 • 
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Aggie's Restaurant has resulted in a discharge of the 
Appellant's obligations to those members to whom he owed 
money. A reversal of the Trial Court's decision would have 
the added effect of discharging the Appelant1s debt to 
Respondent DAB and would thus result in a total discharge 
of the debts incurred by the Appellants without monetary 
expense to Appellants. Such a result is not just in either 
law or equity. ^ 
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CONCLUSION 
From t\vr foregoing it appears clear that the Trial Court's 
I inj'!' * n H > * \ \ i.l'- • ' 11 ijt u v e J s <.»d w i 11 1 x: espec ' » o its cienia 1 c f: Respondei 11' s 
Motic , to dismiss based upon waiver, collateral estoppel and res 
judicat, ib ueriidx ul Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Defective 
Notice. ,r. =?c +-o its dismissal of Respondents Counterclaim against 
Appellants for * . Mtion of 1 \o covenant o~ xjiei. \TA: peaceful 
possess:! o. *. • e 
affirmed as - ^ other matters. 
Respondents ?,7\R \rrTc. adopted P O I U L O i l : : * f 
Respondent ... : .: > » ,. „z reiterating . . .. . . ^e 
entire + <<>» nereof. Respondent Nikol.- :;a.* sh w i . • .- 3rief that 
plaintiff's appeal inasmuch as Appellant failed to serve notice 
of such appeal withi n the ten day limitation as required by the 
r i l ] e s 11 i addi tioi i to Re spoi idei I t N :i ko 1 s ' coiitinen ts , we have s 1 10wn 
i n this Brief that this Court is likewise without jurisdictioi i to 
hear Point 111 of plaintiff 1s appeal inasmuch as Appel ] ai it fa i led 
(. i ?>er ve timely noti ce of thi s appeal wi thin the said tei i day 
limitation Appel 1 ant's cause of action and appeal are unquestionably 
based upon the iin 1 awfi :i ] d e t a : i n o r sf.it it! i i m I, i c c o r i l i n g I , A p p e j 1 a n I 
was bound by the time limitations prescribed w:i th respect thereto. 
Respondent Nikols has also clearly shown that the Trial Cour t: erred 
" " i n<( K v s i j o t i c j t ' i i t ', - D e f e c t i v e I Jot ii.v ,md 
iismissing Respondent s Counterclaim tor violation of the covenant 
of quiet and peaceful possession. 
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With respect to Point IV, Respondent Nikols has shown, in 
his Sub-paragraphs A. and B., that the lease agreement clearly 
provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
and that the Trial Court properly awarded attorneyfs fees to 
Respondents Nikols and DAB, In addition to Respondent Nikols1 
comments, we have shown in this Brief that the Trial Court must have 
found that Appellants were in default under the lease and, 
accordingly, Respondents were entitled to attorney's fees pursuant 
to Paragraph 16 of the lease which provided for an allowance of 
attorney's fees against the defaulting party. Although Respondents 
do not concede that the Trial Court acted properly in dismissing 
their counterclaim, it has been shown that the dismissal thereof 
does not affect the award of attorney's fees. The dismissal of the 
Counterclaim shows only that for one reason or another, the Trial 
Court concluded that Respondents had failed to prove their cause 
of action for breach of the covenant of quiet and peaceful possession. 
The dismissal does not show that Appellants were not in default. 
It has been further shown in this Brief that the attorney fees 
provision of the lease inures to the benefit of Respondents DAB 
by virtue of the fact that the principal lease has been assigned 
to them. Accordingly, the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees 
must be affirmed. 
Respondent Nikols has also, in Points V and VI of his Brief, 
clearly shown that the Trial Court acted properly in determining 
that Respondents were not in default under the lease. Respondent 
Nikols has shown that any change in the operation of the leased 
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premises which may have been made did not constitute a reacli of 
the lease, and that, ever: : : t l * s • .-.o., •:;•"* <-o" , .... 
Jo exiso .-y ar** not sufficient to work a forfeiture of the 
Lease Agreement. 
Court properly awarded judgment in the sum of $613,01 to Respondents 
DAB. The uncontroverted evidence adduced at: - • > 
-o'ensen, I.* ) words ..nul conduct,- obligated himseii * u- L.,.O -urn 
Respondents DAB, Appellant Stevensen wholly failed +.- oTit.nvert 
that evidence in any way whatsoever / i< -
of the Trial Court with respect to the a-varri <-• $(oJ,w 
Respondents DAB must be affirmed. 
Respect f u I 1 ' IILJIM I I . M1 Mi is '. day of p <>: o.,
 ;. „ /I •- ,r 1975 
F. ALAN FLETCHER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondents DAB 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah Hi A I -I / 
MAILING ChRTIr J.CA x i_ 
This is to certify that two copies of !'-e foregoing Brief 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to lames h, Arrowsmith, . :r oui 
Watkins h F.ilUo", Attorneys foi . , • «i* [»eliants
 r Newhouse 
Building, Salt Lake Cityr Utah M . • - ,; t::» Hardin A. Whitney 
and Wayne T. Petty, of and for Mo . •,. Mtornoy-. hot 
De f end.iiils/ Respondents NiLols. ^o Deseret Plaza Buildincj, Salt 
Lake Cit>
 r Utah 841 J], tJ •_ _ ^ _ , o V C ^ r - • # 1975. 
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